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INTRODUCTION 
Due to the rise of globalization and the expansion of trading 
frontiers, international commercial transactions have significantly 
increased in both number and complexity.1 Not surprisingly, this 
resulted in an increasing number of disputes.2 Although national 
courts are the traditional venues for dispute resolution, parties are 
more frequently turning to arbitration as a favorable alternative.3 In 
 
 1. See KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: 
CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-2 
(2003) (explaining that technological innovations and free trade agreements led to 
an increase in the number of cross-border transactions, making business strategies 
and practices increasingly complex). 
 2. See William Wang, Note, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform 
Interim Measures of Relief, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1059, 1059 (2003) (noting that 
increased international trade fostered disputes between states, businesses, and 
individuals); see also JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2003) (identifying differing commercial and legal 
traditions, cultural norms, geography, and politics as sources of disputes in 
international transactions). 
 3. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 773, 778 (2002) (noting the emerging primacy of international 
commercial arbitration as the mechanism for resolving contractual disputes); 
Michael Pryles, The Growth of International Arbitration, AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENT, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ 
rwpattach.nsf/viewasattachmentPersonal/0417185A03AF31B7CA256C8A000251
87/$file/GrowthINtArb.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (analyzing available 
arbitration statistics from different Asian and Pacific regions and identifying an 
upward trend in the use of arbitration); Tatyana V. Slipachuk & Per Runeland, 
Kiev: From Zero to 800 Cases Per Year in Less than 10 Years, 11 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 585, 586 (2000) (charting the consistent increase in arbitration cases 
submitted to the International Commercial Arbitration Court from 1993-1999); 
Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Analysis of UNCITRAL Questionnaires 
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the context of contractual business disputes, international 
commercial arbitration provides a number of benefits not available 
through litigation.4 However, arbitration is not free from downsides,5 
such as difficulties related to the arbitral tribunals’ willingness and 
ability to order and enforce interim measures of protection during 
international commercial arbitration proceedings.6  
Notwithstanding the increasingly frequent use of interim 
measures, there is little consensus about the scope of the arbitral 
tribunal’s powers and how interim actions are enforced.7 In an effort 
to encourage uniformity, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) amended its provision on 
 
on Interim Relief, 16-3 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 11 (2001) (remarking on the 
distinctions among the use of arbitration in the fields of labor, securities, business 
disputes, and consumer transactions). 
 4. See PIETER SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION?: SIXTY YEARS OF 
ARBITRATION PRACTICE 7-8 (1999) (identifying the parties’ ability to choose the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal, language of the proceeding, and rules 
governing the arbitration as special advantages to international arbitration); 
Stephen M. Ferguson, Interim Measures of Protection in International 
Commercial Arbitration: Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Anticipated Results, 
12 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 55, 55 (2003) (confirming simplicity, lower costs, 
confidentiality, and speed of resolution as reasons for favoring arbitration over 
civil litigation); Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection; Security 
for Claims and Costs; and Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (in 
Toto): Article 46, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155, 156-57 (1998) (adding the 
availability of expert arbitrators, the ability to choose in advance the governing 
substantive law, and the avoidance of unpredictable jury trials as advantages to 
arbitration). 
 5. See SANDERS, supra note 4, at 7 (considering the possibility of a final 
arbitral award being set aside as a main drawback to arbitration because of the cost 
and delay involved with post-arbitration court proceedings and the possibility of 
having to initiate new arbitration proceedings to resolve the dispute). 
 6. See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 55 (identifying issues of enforceability, the 
inability of parties to request interim measures prior to the formation of the arbitral 
tribunal, and the reluctance of the tribunal to order interim measures as drawbacks 
arising in international commercial arbitration). 
 7. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001](finding significant differences among national 
arbitration laws on the issuance of interim measures by arbitral tribunals); see, e.g., 
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 347 (4th ed. 2004) (exemplifying the disagreement by 
contrasting an arbitral tribunal ruling under the ICC Rules and a domestic court 
ruling under the Ethiopian Civil Code). 
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interim measures in 2006.8 The revisions to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law (“Model Law”) elaborated on the powers of the arbitral tribunal 
to grant interim measures, defining scope of interim measures and 
the courts’ role of support and enforcement.9  
Despite UNCITRAL’s efforts to foster uniformity and 
harmonization through a model legislative provision and the 
predicted success of the changes,10 the majority of states have yet to 
adopt the amendments to Article 17.11 This Comment argues that 
states should adopt the 2006 amendments to Article 17 because the 
absence of harmonized legislation undermines the validity of 
international commercial arbitration proceedings. 
Part I discusses interim measures in the context of international 
commercial arbitration and explains the 2006 amendments to the 
Model Law. Part II analyzes the Model Law amendment’s 
contributions to international commercial arbitration practice and 
presents reasons for states to incorporate the Model Law 
amendments. Part III recommends how states and arbitral institutions 
should respond to the Model Law amendment and how UNCITRAL 
may be able to improve on the current version of Article 17.  
 
 8. See G.A. Res. 61/33, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006) 
(recognizing the need for revisions to the Model Law in light of current practices 
on interim measures in arbitration, and adopting the amendments proposed by the 
Working Group). 
 9. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Commercial Arbitration, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.V.4 (2008), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ 
ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Model Law] (incorporating the 
amendments in Article 17 of the new “Chapter IV A” relating to interim measures 
and preliminary orders). 
 10. See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 55, 64-65 (predicting that the revisions to 
Article 17 will be widely accepted and will have a significant impact on national 
legislation and institutional arbitration rules). 
 11. See UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, Note by the 
Secretariat, ¶ 5, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/674 (May 
14, 2009) [hereinafter Status of Model Law] (indicating that only four states have 
enacted legislation based on the 2006 Model Law provisions on interim measures, 
significantly lower than the number of states that incorporated the previous 1985 
version of Article 17). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
It is not difficult to understand why parties seeking to settle 
contractual disputes rely on international commercial arbitration.12 
Arbitration proceedings can be highly favorable compared to the 
rigidity and complexity of litigating in national courts.13 International 
commercial arbitration gives parties the freedom to choose the 
arbitrators who will decide their dispute and a confidential forum 
based on the laws and criteria the parties chose.14 Such features are 
particularly important when parties wish to avoid the publicity 
accompanying litigation and to preserve business relationships.15 
A. INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION DEFINED 
At the most fundamental level, interim measures of protection are 
forms of temporary relief16 intended to safeguard the rights of the 
parties until the arbitral tribunal issues a final award.17 Interim 
 
 12. See SANDERS, supra note 4, at 2-6 (discussing arbitration’s advantages of 
expediency, confidentiality, and cost efficiency). 
 13. See id. at 3 (noting that arbitral proceedings are streamlined as compared to 
national court proceedings, and that arbitral appeals are the exception, rather than 
the rule); see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7, 
at 3-4 (contending that although arbitration is an alternative to litigation in national 
courts, it still requires the support of national arbitration legislation and national 
courts to function effectively). 
 14. See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-3 (2008) (outlining consensual 
agreements, non-governmental decision-makers, and final and binding awards as 
defining characteristics of international commercial arbitration). 
 15. See OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8 (1994) (recognizing that arbitration’s privacy is 
particularly well suited for disputes involving sensitive information like trade 
secrets or defective products). 
 16. See John Charles Thomas, Selected Issues: Interim Measures in 
International Arbitration: Finding the Best Answer, 12 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 213, 
213-14 (2005) (distinguishing interim measures, which are temporary actions by 
the tribunal subject to the final award, from partial or interlocutory awards). 
 17. See UNCITRAL, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, Report of the Secretariat, 42, delivered to 
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (Mar. 25, 1985) (enunciating that 
interim measures are meant to “prevent or minimize any disadvantage”); HOWARD 
M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND 
COMMENTARY 542 (1989) (excerpting the Seventh Secretariat Note on the power 
of an arbitral tribunal to order interim measures to protect parties’ rights until the 
final award is rendered); ALI YESILIRMAK, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN 
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measures of protection arise in a variety of circumstances in 
international arbitration and their uses vary depending on the context 
and forum.18 Still, they are a procedural necessity in both public and 
private means of dispute resolution.19 In many cases, interim 
measures determine the efficacy of the arbitral award.20 Interim relief 
can have “final and significant consequences”21 without which an 
adverse party may easily render an award meaningless.22  
 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 4 (2005) (insisting the underlying 
principle of interim measures is that no party’s rights should be negatively affected 
as a result of the duration of the proceedings). 
 18. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
1943-2019 (2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2009] 
(surveying the use of interim measures in international arbitration proceedings and 
explaining the relevant authorities that authorize and govern their use); Ali 
Yesilirmak, Interim and Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitral Practice, 11 ICC 
INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 31, 31 (Spring 2000) (discussing the importance of 
interim measures in protecting party rights during ICC arbitrations); Julian D. M. 
Lew, Commentary on Interim and Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitration 
Cases, 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 23, 26-30 (Spring 2000) (illustrating 
through an analysis of ICC awards how arbitral tribunals use interim measures in 
international commercial arbitration practice); see also Douglas D. Reichert, 
Provisional Remedies in the Context of International Commercial Arbitration, 3 
INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 368, 370-74 (1986) (distinguishing between interim 
measures issued by arbitral tribunals and provisional remedies available through 
the courts to support arbitration proceedings). 
 19. See, e.g., Alan Redfern, Interim Measures, in THE LEADING ARBITRATOR’S 
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 203, 209 (Lawrence W. Newman & 
Richard D. Hill ed., 2008) [hereinafter LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE] (noting the 
increased importance of interim measures in disputes involving international 
transactions due to the relative ease with which evidence and assets can be moved 
across borders); LAWRENCE COLLINS, Provisional and Protective Measures in 
International Litigation, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1, 10 (1994) (assessing the interim protection of rights as an 
established general principle of law in all legal systems). 
 20. See Bernardo M. Cremades, The Need for Conservatory and Preliminary 
Measures, 27 INT’L BUS. LAW. 226, 226-27 (1999) (bemoaning that recalcitrant 
parties, if left unchecked, can render a final award meaningless and unenforceable 
through bad faith and obstruction). 
 21. UNCITRAL, Possible Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Concerning 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Conciliation, Interim Measures of Protection, 
Written Form for Arbitration Agreement, Report of the Secretary General, ¶ 66, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108 (Jan. 14, 
2000) [hereinafter Possible Uniform Rules] (contending that such consequences 
may not be reversible even if the interim order is later modified). 
 22. See UNCITRAL, Working Group on Arbitration, Possible Future Work: 
Court-Ordered Interim Measures of Protection in Support of Arbitration, Scope of 
Interim Measures that May be Issued by Arbitral Tribunals, Validity of the 
BUCY_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  5:28 PM 
2010] HOW TO BEST PROTECT PARTY RIGHTS 585 
Generally, there is little consensus as to the scope, function, and 
proper use of interim measures in arbitration.23 However, certain 
characteristics are common.24 A party to the arbitration must make a 
request25 for a temporary or provisional protective measure under 
conditions demonstrating urgency26 and a risk of serious or 
irreparable harm.27 Additionally, interim measures are binding only 
on the parties to the arbitration28 and the issuing body may review 
and modify the order.29  
 
Agreement to Arbitrate, Report of the Secretary General, ¶ 7, delivered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WF.111 (Oct. 12, 2000) [hereinafter 
Interim Measures] (decrying the ease with which parties can remove assets from a 
jurisdiction to avoid an arbitral award). 
 23. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 340-50 (noting the disparity 
amongst national and institutional rules regarding the use of interim measures). 
Even the names used for identifying interim measures differ by forum.  See, e.g., 
2006 Model Law, supra note 9, arts. 9, 17 (“interim measures”); Bunesgesetz über 
das Internationale Privatrecht [Federal Code on Private International Law] Dec. 18, 
1987, SR 291, art. 183 (Switz.), translated in SWISS CPIL, (Umbricht Attorneys, 
2007) available at http://www.umbricht.com/pdf/SwissPIL.pdf (“provisional or 
protective measures”); London Court of International Arbitration [LCIA], 
Arbitration Rules, Art. 25 (“interim and conservatory measures”); Int’l Chamber of 
Commerce [ICC], Rules of Arbitration, at 23(2) (Jan. 1, 2008) (“interim or 
conservatory measures”); International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes [ICSID], Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and 
Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 39 (Oct. 14, 1966) (“provisional measures”). 
 24. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 5-7 (2005) (delineating nine essential 
characteristics of interim measures in arbitration that are not subject to variation 
from one country to another, including that interim relief “should not exceed the 
final relief. . .” and “should normally be granted where it is risky to await the final 
relief”). 
 25. See, e.g., 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 17 (providing for interim 
measures only at the request of a party). 
 26. See Partial Award in Case 8113, 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 65, 67-
68 (Spring 2000) [hereinafter Case 8113] (reiterating that urgency is the basic 
requirement for granting provisional relief); Panacaviar, S.A. v. Iran, Case No. 
498, Award No. ITM 64-498-1 (Dec. 4, 1986), reprinted in 13 IRAN-US CTR 193, 
196-98 (denying a request for the stay of court proceedings because the request 
demonstrated no urgency as it was made six years after the commencement of the 
proceedings). 
 27. See, e.g., Case of 8113, supra note 26, at 65-69 (refusing to grant interim 
measures when the damages awarded would fully compensate for loss incurred); 
Markus Wirth, Interim or Preventive Measures in Support of International 
Arbitration in Switzerland, 18 ASA BULL. 31, 36-37 (2000) (defining the level of 
detriment as that which cannot “easily be remedied (exposure to ‘irreparable’ 
harm)”). 
 28. See Houston Putnam Lowry, Recent Developments in International 
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Interim measures generally fall into two broad categories:30 1) 
measures aimed at avoiding or minimizing loss, damage, or 
prejudice;31 and 2) measures facilitating the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.32 Measures meant to avoid loss, damage, or prejudice usually 
serve the purpose of preserving the state of affairs pending the final 
resolution of the dispute.33 They are functionally similar to court 
injunctions in that they may require a party to continue performance 
or abstain from taking certain actions that may frustrate the 
resolution of the dispute.34 Common examples of such measures 
include orders for the preservation of evidence related to the subject 
matter of the dispute, orders for the sale of perishable goods to 
 
Commercial Arbitration, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 335, 340 (2004) 
(recognizing that it is hornbook law that arbitrators’ decisions are not binding on 
third parties); see also UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration 
on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, ¶ 64, delivered to the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468 (Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Report of the Thirty-Second 
Session] (highlighting that although arbitral tribunals cannot bind third parties, 
they can still significantly affect parties outside the arbitration who may, for 
example, possess assets of a party). 
 29. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 64 
(characterizing the ability to review or modify interim measures based on situation 
specific circumstances or case progress as a salient procedure to be included in any 
uniform provision). The ability to review or modify awards is also present in many 
sets of arbitration rules. See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes [ICSID] Arbitration Rules, Rule 39 (stipulating that the tribunal may 
modify or revoke awards only after giving the parties the opportunity to present 
their observations); Singapore International Arbitration Centre [SIAC] Arbitration 
Rules, Rule 26.1 (1997) (allowing for confirmation or amendment of a provisional 
order by any arbitrator possessing jurisdiction); Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & 
Docs., art. 76(1) (condoning modification if justified by a change in the situation). 
 30. See UNCITRAL, Working Group II, Settlement of Commercial Disputes, 
Preparation of Uniform Provisions on Interim Measures of Protection, Note by the 
Secretariat, ¶ 16, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.119 (Jan. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes] (noting that distinctions between specific types of interim measures are 
not always clear and that interim measures can fall into more than one category). 
 31. See id. ¶ 17 (encompassing measures that maintain the respective positions 
of the parties until the final award). 
 32. See id. ¶ 18 (including measures concerning assets, property, and security 
for costs that ensure that there will be sufficient available resources to satisfy the 
arbitral award). 
 33. See id. ¶¶ 16-17 (explaining that such measures ensure that the parties do 
not cause unnecessary harm through their actions, or inactions, during the 
arbitration proceedings). 
 34. See LEW ET AL., supra note 2, at 596-97 (discussing measures that regulate 
and stabilize party relations during arbitral proceedings). 
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minimize damages, and orders ensuring confidentiality of 
information disclosed during the proceedings.35 
Equally important are those measures aimed at facilitating later 
enforcement of the arbitral award.36 Interim measures ensure that 
actions taken by an adverse party during the arbitration proceedings 
to avoid enforcement do not render the arbitral tribunal’s final award 
meaningless.37 These measures include ordering parties to provide 
security for costs,38 attaching or freezing assets to prevent removal 
from the jurisdiction,39 or depositing the assets that would be used to 
satisfy the award with a third party pending the resolution of the 
dispute.40  
 
 35. See Settlement of Commercial Disputes, supra note 30, ¶ 17 (including also 
the appointment of administrators to manage income-producing assets during the 
proceedings, orders for inspections at an early stage of the proceedings when there 
is the strong possibility the situation may change, and orders preventing the loss of 
a party’s right). 
 36. See id. ¶ 18 (providing that parties may request orders to freeze assets and 
post security for the amount in dispute and the cost of arbitration). 
 37. See Lawrence F. Ebb, Flight of Assets from the Jurisdiction “In the 
Twinkling of a Telex”: Pre- and Post- Award Conservatory Relief in International 
Commercial Arbitrations, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 9, 9-10 (1990) (lamenting the ease and 
frequency with which losing parties can remove mobile assets from the jurisdiction 
to avoid enforcement of the arbitral award). 
 38. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1387 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004) 
(defining “security for costs” as “[m]oney, property, or a bond given to a court by 
a plaintiff or appellant to secure the payment of court costs if the party loses”); 
YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 214-15 (applying the traditional definition of 
security for costs to arbitration and recognizing that under a number of arbitration 
rules, arbitrators can require a party to provide security for costs, which can 
include the costs of the arbitration proceedings, but also acknowledging that such 
orders are highly debated); Interim Award in Case 8786 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. 
81, 82-83 (Spring 2000) (citing cases granting security for payment). 
 39. See Kevin J. Brody, Note, An Argument for Pre-Award Attachment in 
International Arbitration Under the New York Convention, 18 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
99, 100 (1985) (finding pre-award attachment or garnishment useful in coercing 
adverse party cooperation); Joseph D. Becker, Attachments in Aid of International 
Arbitration—the American Position, 1 ARB. INT’L 40, 40-41 (1985) (explaining 
attachments are used for the purpose of security in arbitration proceedings). 
 40. See, e.g., Nederlands Arbitrage Instituut [NAI], Interim Award in Case No. 
1694, American Producer v. German Constr. Co., XIII YBCA 97 (Dec. 12, 1996) 
(ordering a party to provide a $6.5 million bank guarantee). 
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B. POWER OF ARBITRATORS TO ISSUE INTERIM MEASURES OF 
PROTECTION 
Historically, states viewed the power to issue interim measures as 
belonging solely to the national courts,41 which was rooted in public 
policy concerns.42 However, over time, states began to recognize the 
effectiveness and reliability of arbitration in resolving disputes.43 To 
acknowledge the increasing use of arbitration and the necessity for 
protections of party rights comparable to those provided by national 
courts, states amended national arbitration laws to allow arbitrators 
some power to order interim relief.44 States began to view the courts’ 
role as supportive of arbitration, rather than considering them 
separately. As a result, states modernized their national arbitration 
laws to either expressly allow for the issuance of interim orders by 
arbitral tribunals or to allow parties to agree to confer such power.45 
 
 41. See LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 19, at 209 (observing that 
states were initially reluctant to grant arbitral tribunals the power to issue interim 
measures); see, e.g., C. Proc. Civ. Y Com. 766, Art. 753 [Argentine National Code 
of Civil and Commercial Procedure] (“Arbitrators cannot order compulsory 
measures or measures leading to enforcement.”); Italian Code of Civil Procedure, 
Title VII, Art. 818 (1997), available at www.camera-arbitrale.com (“The 
arbitrators may not grant attachments or other interim measures of protection.”); 
P.R.C.: Arbitration Law, art. 68, translated in 34 I.L.M. 1650 (1995) [hereinafter 
China Arbitration Law] (asserting that any request for interim relief must be 
referred to the courts). 
 42. See Lew, supra note 18, at 24 (supporting the delegation of power to issue 
interim measures solely to the national courts in response to the difficulties 
national courts faced in enforcing an arbitral tribunal’s orders for interim measures 
and a tribunal’s lack of coercive powers to enforce their own orders). 
 43. See, e.g., Neil E. McDonell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 273, 275-77 
(1984) (comparing the development of several national laws regarding the 
availability of provisional relief in arbitration proceedings). 
 44. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD 
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 715-16 (1999) 
(elaborating on the modernization of national laws to allow for concurrent powers 
regarding conservatory measures in arbitration proceedings). 
 45. E.g., Houdende het gerechtelijk wetboek [Belgian Judicial Code], art. 
1696., available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm//belgiu m.code.judicature.1998/sisu 
_manifest.html (permitting the tribunal to issue interim relief at the request of a 
party with the exception of attachment orders); Arbitration Act, 1996 c. 23, § 39 
(Eng.), available at www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/ukpg a_19960023_en_3#pt1-
pb7-L1g39 (permitting the parties to agree to give the tribunal the power to issue 
interim relief); Arbitration Act, 1986, art. 1051 (Neth.) (permitting an agreement 
allowing the tribunal to issue an award in a summary proceeding, within certain 
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C. UNCITRAL’S 2006 AMENDMENT TO MODEL LAW 
ARTICLE 17 
The UNCITRAL Model Law, originally adopted in 1985,46 is a 
cornerstone of international commercial arbitration practice.47 By 
2005, at least forty-three states specifically incorporated Model Law 
provisions on interim measures into their national arbitration laws.48 
However, as of 2004, over half of these incorporated more detail into 
their national legislation than was provided in the Model Law.49  
In an effort to modernize the Model Law to conform to the actual 
practices of international commercial arbitration, the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat identified thirteen potential topics for future work by the 
Commission and recognized the use and enforceability of interim 
measures as a priority.50 UNCITRAL assigned this project to 
Working Group II, which conducted deliberations for review and 
revision, and subsequently produced draft provisions for amending 
the Model Law.51  
In explaining the need for UNCITRAL’s attention to interim 
measures, the Secretary General said:  
[P]arties are seeking interim measures in an increasing 
number of cases. This trend and lack of clear guidance to 
arbitral tribunals as to the scope of interim measures that may 
 
limits). 
 46. G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985). 
 47. See Eric E. Bergsten, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration From International to National Legislation: Implementation of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration into National 
Legislation, 10 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 101, 101 (2003) (declaring the Model Law to 
be “an extraordinarily successful example of international preparation of a legal 
text”). 
 48. PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 394-95 (2d. ed. 2005). 
 49. Id. (providing a comparison chart with forty-six countries as to the 
amendmendments these countries have made to their arbitration laws). 
 50. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 286, ¶ 9 (including the 
enforcement of interim measures as one of four priority items for the creation of 
uniform provisions). 
 51. See generally UNCITRAL, Working Group II, 2000 to Present: 
International Arbitration and Conciliation, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) 
(providing the session reports of the Working Group on Arbitration detailing its 
deliberations and progress). 
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be issued and the conditions for their issuance may hinder the 
effective and efficient functioning of international 
commercial arbitration. . . . [T]his may lead to undesirable 
consequences . . . [and] may also prompt parties to seek 
interim measures from courts instead of the arbitral tribunals 
in situations where the arbitral tribunal would be well placed 
to issue an interim measure; this causes unnecessary cost and 
delay . . . .52 
The purpose of revising Article 17 was to clarify three important 
elements regarding the use of interim measures: 1) the scope of the 
arbitral tribunal’s power to order interim relief; 2) the enforcement of 
tribunal ordered interim measures; and 3) the role of the courts in 
supporting arbitration; all of which were left open-ended and 
undeveloped by the previous provision.53 Before the 2006 
amendment, Article 17 read: 
Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal 
may, at the request of a party, order any party to take such 
interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may 
consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the 
dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide 
appropriate security in connection with such measure.54 
Based in part on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,55 this provision 
provides little, if any, guidance as to the scope and substance of the 
arbitral tribunal’s power to issue interim measures.56  
Additionally, Model Law Article 9 provides that requests to a 
national court for interim measures are not incompatible with the 
decision to arbitrate.57 Under Article 9, courts may hear requests for 
 
 52. Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶ 104. 
 53. See id. ¶ 103 (discussing the necessity for clarification in light of the many 
broad formulations of arbitrator powers found in national arbitration laws). 
 54. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration, U.N. 
Doc. A/40/17,/Annex (June 21, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 Model Law]. 
 55. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 26(1)  (“[T]he arbitral tribunal may 
take any interim measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of 
the dispute.”). 
 56. See BINDER, supra note 48, at 152 (recognizing the “consider necessary” 
clause as the only limit to the arbitral tribunal’s discretion). 
 57. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 9 (ensuring that a request for 
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interim measures by parties in arbitration, but the Article lacks clear 
guidance on the courts’ role in ordering such measures once arbitral 
proceedings are initiated.58 Both Articles 9 and 17 fail to address the 
scope and procedural issues involved with concurrent jurisdiction.59  
By amending Article 17, UNCITRAL sought to provide clarity 
and guidance. After nearly six years, Article 17 grew from a single 
paragraph provision to a detailed outline of the procedures for 
interim measures.60 The goal of the amended Model Law was to 
acknowledge and harmonize existing legislation and practices in the 
field as opposed to creating new rules or standards for the arbitration 
process.61 The amended version of Article 17 is intended to address 
the concerns, confusion, and criticisms surrounding the previous text 
by outlining in detail the procedural aspects of the use of interim 
measures that the provision lacked.62 
II. ANALYSIS 
UNCITRAL’s recognition of the inadequacies of the previous 
Model Law on interim measures of protection led to the development 
 
interim relief to the courts does not constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate). 
 58. See id. (providing that a request to the court does not violate the arbitration 
agreement, but positing no further explanation of how the courts should respond). 
 59. See Christopher Huntley, The Scope of Article 17: Interim Measures Under 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, 9 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 69, 69, 74-75 
(noting that the lack of a comprehensive description of the boundaries of Model 
Law provisions related to interim relief forces tribunals to define the scope of their 
mandate to award interim measures on a case by case basis). 
 60. Compare 1985 Model Law, supra note 54, art. 17 (granting arbitrators a 
general power to order interim relief related to the subject matter of the dispute), 
with 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 17 (including provisions on the power of 
arbitral tribunals to issue interim measures, conditions for granting interim 
measures, procedures regarding preliminary orders, recognition and enforcement 
of interim measures, and the role of court-ordered interim measures). 
 61. See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 60 (discussing the objectives of the Model 
Law as harmonization, minimization of court intervention, respect for parties’ 
freedom of choice, providing court assistance in support of proceedings and 
enforceability of awards, and ensuring fairness and due process in arbitration 
proceedings through mandatory provisions to be followed by arbitrators, courts, 
and parties to the dispute). 
 62. See Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 6-29 (describing the difficulties 
arising from the previous text and prescribing as the remedy provisions on 
categories of interim measures available, guidelines on court enforcement, and the 
availability of court-ordered interim relief). 
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of what promised to be an essential text in arbitration.63 But despite 
predictions of widespread acceptance, the majority of states have not 
integrated the new version of Article 17.64 This, however, should not 
detract from the important purposes the amendment will serve.65  
There are a number of compelling reasons why states should 
incorporate the amendments to Article 17.66 In particular, states 
should consider that the efficacy of arbitration proceedings depends 
on the use and enforcement of interim measures. Furthermore, 
arbitration is a practical and efficient forum for ordering interim 
relief, and adoption of the Model Law amendment will harmonize 
national arbitration laws. This will inspire the confidence necessary 
for the survival of international commercial arbitration as a 
prominent dispute resolution mechanism.  
A. STATES’ FAILURE TO USE AND ENFORCE INTERIM 
MEASURES OF PROTECTION UNDERMINE THE EFFICACY OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
In preliminary discussions on possible Model Law amendments, 
UNCITRAL noted that interim measures of protection are critical to 
the facilitation of dispute resolution in every legal system.67 Interim 
relief, or the lack thereof, can have a substantial or even 
determinative effect on the outcome of any case, whether submitted 
to litigation or arbitration.68 When parties litigate disputes, national 
 
 63. See Huntley, supra note 59, at 69 (calling the Model Law “one of the most 
important bodies of law in the world of international commercial arbitration”). 
 64. See Status of Model Law, supra note 11, ¶ 5 (indicating that of the nearly 
seventy jurisdictions operating under the Model Law, only Mauritius, New 
Zealand, Peru, and Slovenia have adopted legislation based on the 2006 
amendments). 
 65. See Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 10-11 (noting that, currently, 
while some countries have adopted adequate legislative regimes to address 
enforcement issues, these countries are still unable to enforce protective measures 
against parties in countries that lack adequate regulation). 
 66. See e.g. Ferguson, supra note 4, at 65 (noting a reduction in the caseloads 
of national courts as one expected impact of the revised articles on interim 
measures). 
 67. See Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶ 6 (expressing interim relief’s 
importance in the context of protecting party rights and effectively resolving 
disputes). 
 68. See Raymond J. Werbicki, Arbitral Interim Measures: Fact or Fiction?, 57 
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courts have established procedures for determining when and to what 
extent they will grant interim relief.69 Unfortunately, this is not the 
case in international commercial arbitration.  
Still, interim measures of protection in arbitration proceedings are 
just as important as in litigation proceedings.70 They ensure that 
disputes are resolved in a fair and effective manner, with the primary 
purpose of protecting parties’ rights during the proceedings.71 In 
discussing improvements to the Model Law provisions on interim 
measures, UNCITRAL noted the importance of ensuring “that 
parties choosing to resolve their disputes through arbitration do not 
forfeit any rights to avail themselves of any interim relief measure 
that they would have had in litigation.”72 Interim measures compel 
parties in arbitration to behave in a manner that allows for effective 
and efficient proceedings and ensures that the subsequent final award 
is not rendered meaningless.73 Ultimately, interim measures are 
necessary because no party should sustain additional damages during 
the arbitration proceedings.74 
As parties rely more on arbitration to resolve their disputes, it 
follows that there will also be an increase in requests for interim 
 
DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 63 (2003) (emphasizing that the lack of interim relief 
compromises a party’s ability to preserve necessary evidence and increases the risk 
that a prevailing party may not be able to recover the final award). 
 69. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7, at 920 
(explaining that the range of provisional measures provided by national courts are 
generally the same among all developed legal systems). 
 70. See id. (adding that interim measures are, nonetheless, difficult to obtain in 
the international arbitration setting). 
 71. See Carbonneau, supra note 3, at 773-74 (suggesting such measures are 
especially necessary to accomplish these goals given the unique difficulties posed 
by cross-border transactions, including the diversity of regimes and the pursuit of 
nationalistic self-interest). 
 72. Settlement of Commercial Disputes, supra note 30, ¶ 15. But see Card v. 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 806, 813-14 (D. Minn. 1996) (internal 
citation omitted) (characterizing arbitration as a “creature born of a contract,“ 
meaning that parties cannot expect to receive all of the procedural and substantive 
protections available in the courts, but rather only those protections to which they 
have agreed). 
 73. Ferguson, supra note 4, at 55. 
 74. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 5 (implying that parties’ decision to 
arbitrate should not subject them to damages while awaiting the final award that 
would otherwise have not been incurred in litigation). 
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relief from arbitral tribunals.75 This elevates the importance of 
incorporating procedures for interim measures into governing 
arbitration law.76 Furthermore, it is a rational assumption that parties 
intend for arbitration proceedings to resolve the entire dispute.77 If 
parties are unable to obtain comparable interim relief in the arbitral 
context and are instead forced to rely on courts to secure such relief, 
parties will be dissuaded from submitting their disputes to 
arbitration.78  
The actual use of interim measures further demonstrates the 
necessity of incorporating them into governing arbitration laws.79 A 
wide range of arbitration laws and rules empower arbitrators, albeit 
vaguely, to issue interim relief.80 When an arbitral tribunal fails to 
 
 75. See Wang, supra note 2, at 1059-60 (viewing the rapid expansion in the use 
of arbitration as contributing to the importance of interim measures in arbitration 
proceedings and the need for a solid framework for their use). Although some 
argue that the number of requests for interim relief in arbitration proceedings is 
insufficient to support amending rules and legislation in order to empower arbitral 
tribunals to order interim measures, this critique ignores a key point: parties may 
not request interim relief from arbitration tribunals in the first place given the 
“widely felt uncertainty” as to the availability of such relief.  LEW ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 589 n.13. 
 76. See David E. Wagoner, Interim Relief in International Arbitration: 
Enforcement is a Substantial Problem, 51 DIS. RESOL. J. 68, 69 (1996) (asserting 
the compelling need for the availability of interim relief in international arbitration 
to protect party rights pending a final decision by the arbitral tribunal). 
 77. See D. Alan Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts: Interim Measures of 
Protection – Is the Tide About to Turn?, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 71, 72-73 (1995) 
[hereinafter Arbitration and the Courts] (positing that parties who employ an 
arbitration clause can reasonably be expected to resolve any disputes by the agreed 
upon method of dispute resolution, though also noting that in some instances 
parties prefer the greater power of the courts). 
 78. Cf. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, at 718-19 (reiterating that 
jurisdiction over the dispute is determined in almost all cases by the agreement of 
the parties, except that parties cannot, by agreement, augment the powers of the 
arbitrator to grant certain types of relief that remain within the exclusive power of 
courts). 
 79. See generally LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 19, 203-21 
(classifying interim measures into four broad categories: those intended to 
facilitate the arbitral proceeding, those intended to preserve the status quo, those 
intended to assist enforcement of future awards, and those intended to afford 
security for the costs of arbitration). 
 80. See Settlement of Commercial Disputes, supra note 30, ¶¶ 11, 13-33 
(consolidating the results of a UNCITRAL survey on the practices of nations 
regarding their procedures for interim relief in arbitration and finding, inter alia, 
that several rules recognize the concurrent power of courts and arbitral tribunals to 
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order interim relief, either because existing legislation fails to grant 
this power to the tribunal81 or because the tribunal chooses not to 
exercise its power,82 the adverse party may remove assets from a 
jurisdiction, destroy evidence, or otherwise frustrate the 
proceedings.83 Such actions can cause irreparable harm to the 
requesting party84 and this failure to protect parties undermines the 
favorability of the arbitration process.85 
UNCITRAL amended Article 17 to account for each of the above 
considerations. Article 17 recognizes the importance of interim 
measures and the need for arbitration procedures to meet the 
practical needs of the parties.86 It also acknowledges that in order for 
these measures to be effective, there must be structure and standards 
for the use of interim measures.87 The amended Model Law explicitly 
provides that arbitral tribunals have the power to issue interim 
 
issue interim relief). See also Werbicki, supra note 68, at 64 (clarifying that even 
though arbitrators may have broad discretion to grant interim measures, their 
power is actually limited by a number of factors, including the difficulty of 
enforcement, the inability to respond to urgent requests for interim measures, and 
the effect of the governing law of arbitration in the jurisdiction). 
 81. See, e.g., C. Proc. Civ. Y Com. 766, Art, 753 [Argentine National Code of 
Civil and Commercial Procedure] (“Arbitrators cannot order compulsory measures 
or measures leading to enforcement.”); Italian Code of Civil Procedure, Title VII, 
Art. 818 (1997), available at www.camera-arbitrale.com (“The arbitrators may not 
grant attachments or other interim measures of protection.”) 
 82. See supra Part I.B (discussing the reluctance of arbitrators to provide 
interim relief because of confusion or lack of coercive powers). 
 83. See supra Part I.A (discussing appropriate uses for and purposes of interim 
relief). 
 84. See Wagoner, supra note 76, at 69 (identifying environmental impact cases, 
trade secret disputes, and the direct appointment of a receiver as instances in which 
interim measures are required for effective management of the arbitration); Interim 
Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 7-12 (identifying the issue of unenforceable final 
awards as a primary concern for the Working Group). 
 85. Cf. Ira M. Schwartz, Interim and Emergency Relief in Arbitration 
Proceedings, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 57-58 (noting the pervasive, and erroneous, 
belief that parties cannot obtain interim relief in arbitration). 
 86. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 60 (recognizing 
the increased use of interim measures in arbitral proceedings and the necessity for 
such measures to be available and enforceable for the continued effectiveness of 
international commercial arbitration). 
 87. See generally Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶¶ 30-32 (stating the 
Working Group’s belief that conformity with the Model Law would ameliorate the 
existing disparities with regards to states’ recognition of the authority of arbitral 
tribunals to grant interim measures). 
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measures, details which measures are available, and explains the 
conditions under which such measures can be granted.88 For 
example, the amended Model Law acknowledges the inherent 
necessity for interim measures in cases where the requesting party 
can show that failure to issue such protective measures will likely 
result in harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages.89  
States can provide sound procedural and substantive guidance for 
the use of interim measures by incorporating the amended Article 17 
into national arbitration legislation. In doing so, states can also 
recognize the importance of interim measures in arbitration, respect 
participating parties’ freedom to choose arbitration, and demonstrate 
support for the continued use of international commercial arbitration. 
B. ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS ARE A PRACTICAL AND EFFICIENT 
FORUM FOR GRANTING INTERIM MEASURES 
Parties more frequently request interim relief from arbitral 
tribunals.90 However, arbitral tribunals have been hesitant to grant 
requests because of the confusion surrounding the scope of their 
powers.91 In 1985, UNCITRAL attempted to remedy these concerns 
by providing in the Model Law that arbitrators were empowered to 
order interim relief.92 However, this only superficially solved the 
problem because the provision did not delve into the procedural or 
 
 88. 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 17. 
 89. See id. art. 17A(1) (“[T]he party requesting an interim measure . . . shall 
satisfy the arbitral tribunal that . . . [h]arm not adequately reparable by an award of 
damages is likely to result . . . and such harm substantially outweighs the harm . . . 
to the party against whom the measure is directed . . . .”). 
 90. See Naimark & Keer, supra note 3, at 11 (studying the use of interim relief 
in arbitration and finding an increase in requests for interim relief to arbitrators); 
cf. Jan K. Schaefer, New Solutions for Interim Measures of Protection in 
International Commercial Arbitration: English, German and Hong Kong Law 
Compared, 2.2 ELEC. J. COMP. L. § 6 (1998), http://www.ejcl.org/22/art22-2.html 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (implying that some states have amended their 
domestic arbitration laws to account for the growing use of interim relief). 
 91. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7, at 922 
(doubting that an arbitrator will issue interim relief unless satisfied that an order is 
permissible under the applicable national arbitration legislation); see also Christian 
Hausmaninger, Civil Liability of Arbitrators – Comparative Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 7, 7-8 (1990) (discussing the risk of civil 
liability for arbitrators and arbitrators’ resultant fear of misusing their authority). 
 92. 1985 Model Law, supra note 54, art. 17. 
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substantive issues involved in allowing arbitrators to order interim 
measures.93  
Still, the arbitral tribunal is well established as an appropriate 
forum for granting interim relief.94 The arbitral tribunal is sometimes 
referred to as the “natural judge,”95 because the arbitrator is in the 
best position to assess the claim’s possibility of success on the merits 
and can appropriately evaluate the impact that interim measures may 
have on the parties and the arbitration proceedings.96 Arbitrators are 
also better able to identify when requests for interim relief are 
abusive and employed for tactical purposes.97 Additionally, allowing 
arbitral tribunals to issue interim relief prevents unnecessary costs 
and delays that accompany a request for interim relief to the national 
courts.98 It also further promotes freedom to choose arbitration as the 
means for resolving the dispute.99 
However, the procedure for obtaining interim relief during 
arbitrations can be complicated when national courts have concurrent 
 
 93. See Lowry, supra note 28, at 339 (noting that a variety of promulgated 
rules, including UNCITRAL’s 1985 Model law, recognize the power of arbitral 
tribunals to issue interim measures, but highlighting the lack of consensus about 
what types of interim measures can be issued or what enforcement mechanisms are 
available). 
 94. See Cecil Branson, Global Development: Interim Measures of Protection in 
a Changing International Commercial Arbitration,  9 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 9, 11 
(2002) (affirming that measures aimed at facilitating arbitral proceedings should be 
within the scope of arbitrators’ powers because of the tribunal’s emphasis on party 
autonomy and fairness); Biwater Gauff Ltd. V. United Republic of Tanzania, 
Procedural Order No. 3, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 ¶ 135 (Sept. 29, 2007), 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org (observing that it is a matter of settled law 
that arbitral tribunals can order parties to take provisional measures). 
 95. YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 66. 
 96. See LEW ET AL., supra note 2, at 589 (noting that an arbitrator’s familiarity 
with the legal and factual intricacies of the case make the arbitral tribunal a more 
appropriate forum to determine the appropriateness of interim measures than a 
domestic court). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Michael E. Chionopoulos, Preliminary Injunction Through Arbitration: 
The Franchisor’s Weapon of Choice in Trademark Disputes, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 
15, 15 (2000) (advising parties already engaged in arbitration against filing for 
interim relief in court since it requires payment of additional filing fees, attorneys’ 
fees, and other miscellaneous costs involved with court proceedings). 
 99. See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 24 (1997) (recognizing respect for 
party autonomy as fundamental to arbitration practice). 
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jurisdiction.100 Although arbitrators may possess a degree of power 
and discretion to issue interim measures, a party to an arbitration can 
still apply for interim relief to a court.101 In determining whether to 
grant a request for interim relief, a court must consider both the 
moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits and the necessity 
of interim relief.102 This inevitably involves the court in the main 
issues of the dispute.103 This is not to say that national courts have no 
place in procedures for granting interim relief during arbitration. In 
some cases, the national courts are the only forums from which 
parties can obtain interim relief.104 Rather, arbitrators should be 
clearly vested with the power to order interim relief in situations 
where they constitute the most appropriate forum.105 Despite 
concerns that concurrent jurisdiction may allow national courts to 
unnecessarily impose on arbitral disputes,106 concurrent jurisdiction 
does not allow courts to rule on the substance of the dispute and 
thereby intervene in matters under the arbitral tribunal’s 
 
 100. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Is Exclusion of Concurrent Courts’ 
Jurisdiction Over Conservatory Measures to be Introduced Through a Revision of 
the Conventions?, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 105, 111 (1989) (highlighting the complex, but 
sometimes complimentary, effect of concurrent jurisdiction). 
 101. 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 9. 
 102. See Alison C. Wauk, Comment, Preliminary Injunctions in Arbitrable 
Disputes: The Case for Limited Court Jurisdiction, 44 UCLA L. REV. 2061, 2073-
75 (1997) (finding that a court cannot decide to grant relief without first 
examining, to some extent, the facts and underlying issues of the dispute). Channel 
Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. [1993] A.C. 334, 367-368 
(“There is always a tension when the court is asked to order, by way of interim 
relief in support of arbitration, a remedy of the same kind as will ultimately be 
sought from the arbitrators . . . .”). This perspective exemplifies national courts’ 
hesitation to grant interim relief when doing so may prejudice the ability of arbitral 
proceedings to effectively resolve the dispute. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 
7, at 349. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See, e.g., China Arbitration Law, supra note 41, arts. 28, 46; Czech 
Republic Law on Arbitral Proceedings and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 1994, 
Section 22; Québec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. 1, art. 940.4 (Can.) 
(noting that parties cannot obtain interim relief from arbitral tribunals and must 
therefore resort to national courts). 
 105. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2009, supra note 18, at 
1950 n.38 (“[I]f a tribunal is competent to decide an issue finally, with binding 
effect, why should it not be competent to decide the same issue provisionally?”). 
 106. See Wauk, supra note 102, at 2075-78 (finding concurrent jurisdiction on 
matters of interim relief to be an infringement on party autonomy and arbitrators’ 
powers). 
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jurisdiction.107 Instead, concurrent jurisdiction often remedies the 
shortcomings of arbitration and ensures the effectiveness of the 
arbitration proceedings.108 Major criticisms of orders for interim 
relief by arbitral tribunals include the unavailability of relief prior to 
the formation of the arbitral tribunal,109 the tribunal’s inability to bind 
third parties,110 and the tribunal’s lack of imperium to enforce its 
awards.111 Concurrent jurisdiction addresses these concerns by 
providing a forum in the courts to request measures prior to the 
formation of the tribunal, the ability of court orders to bind third 
parties if necessary, and the ability to enforce both their own and 
arbitral tribunal orders.112  
Recognizing the important functions of both the arbitrators and the 
courts in procedures for interim relief, UNCITRAL amended Article 
17 to provide a procedural framework incorporating concurrent 
jurisdiction.113 To remedy the confusion surrounding the 
 
 107. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 68 (explaining that under the concurrent 
jurisdiction approach, the substance of a dispute remains with the arbitrators). 
 108. See GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, at 711 (identifying as a rationale 
behind concurrent jurisdiction the notion that parties should not be deprived of the 
expediency of courts in the provision of interim relief solely because of the 
existence of an arbitration agreement). 
 109. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 23, art. 23(2) (directing parties to apply to 
judicial authorities for interim relief in the event the file has not yet been 
transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal); see also Ferguson, supra note 4, at 58 
(highlighting the lack of procedures available to parties for acquiring interim relief 
prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal). 
 110. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶¶ 64, 70 
(emphasizing that the tribunal can only act in regard to the parties to the dispute); 
Intertec Contracting A/S v. Turner Steiner Int’l, SA, No. 98 Civ. 9116 (CSH), 
2000 WL 709004 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that actions taken regarding the 
arbitration agreement are “restricted to the immediate parties [to the contract]”). 
 111. See Christian Hausmaninger, The ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Procedure: A Step Towards Solving the Problem of Provisional Relief in 
International Commercial Arbitration?, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 82, 87 
(1992)(stating that arbitrators lack the coercive powers to enforce their orders); 
Interim Award in Case 5835, 8 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 67, 69 (May 1997) 
(admitting that arbitrators’ interim orders are less protective due to the lack of 
enforcement power). But see Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶ 75 (noting 
that, although arbitral tribunals lack coercive powers, coercion is usually 
unnecessary for party cooperation). 
 112. See GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, at 711 (finding the parties’ 
requests to the courts for interim relief more effective in cases requiring urgency or 
readily enforceable orders). 
 113. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶¶ 28-30, (discussing the 
BUCY_AUTHOR_CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  5:28 PM 
600 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:579 
appropriateness and power of arbitrators to issue interim relief, 
Article 17 explicitly empowers arbitral tribunals to order interim 
measures unless otherwise agreed by the parties.114 It also provides 
arbitrators with guidance on the types of interim measures they can 
issue, thereby reinforcing that they have the discretion to do so.115 
Furthermore, Article 17 delineates the courts’ role in enforcing 
orders for interim measures made by the arbitral tribunal.116  
Adoption of Article 17 would resolve the confusion about the 
respective powers of arbitral tribunals and the courts in granting 
interim relief.117 This would result in a more efficient procedural 
framework leaving arbitral tribunals to focus on the substantive and 
procedural issues necessary to effectively resolve a dispute,118 while 
the courts would be precluded from making factual determinations 
and focus solely on enforcing the tribunal’s decisions.119  
 
empowerment of arbitrators to order interim relief and adding that Article 17 was 
drafted to ensure that a competent court may also issue interim relief). 
 114. See id. art. 17(1). Additionally, arbitration agreements can express the 
parties’ views on recourse to national courts for interim relief. See, e.g., Remy 
Amerique, Inc. v. Touzet Distribution, S.A.R.L., 816 F. Supp. 213, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (containing an arbitration agreement that explicitly provided that the parties 
could seek interim relief from any appropriate court). 
 115. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, art. 12(2)(a)-(d) (providing that the 
“interim measures” an arbitral tribunal can issue are those orders that maintain or 
restore the status quo, prevent harm to the parties or prejudice to the arbitration 
proceedings, preserve assets to satisfy a final award, and preserve evidence). 
 116. See id. art. 17H-17I (outlining the courts’ responsibility to recognize 
interim measures issued by an arbitral tribunal and detailing the grounds for 
refusing recognition or enforcement). 
 117. See id. art. 17 (providing that both arbitrators and the courts maintain 
concurrent powers to issue enforceable interim measures of protection); see also, 
id. art. 9 (stating that a request to the courts is not incompatible with an arbitration 
agreement). 
 118. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 82 (observing 
that guidelines providing clarifications of arbitrators’ power to order interim 
measures would also foster states’ acceptance of both those guidelines and uniform 
legislation enforcement). 
 119. See id. ¶ 71 (underscoring the point that courts should limit their discretion 
to the procedural aspects of enforcing interim measures and should not involve 
themselves in the substance of the measure or the tribunal’s conclusions). 
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C. ADOPTION OF ARTICLE 17 WILL FOSTER HARMONIZATION 
OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS IN NATIONAL ARBITRATION 
LAWS  
There is currently no uniform practice in granting interim relief in 
arbitration.120 National laws differ significantly on the scope of the 
arbitrators’ powers and in some cases use language so vague that any 
power lying with the arbitrators is implied.121 This lack of clarity and 
uniformity raises concerns about predictability and enforcement.122 
These concerns, if left unaddressed, could have serious implications 
for the future of arbitration, given that the success of arbitration is 
dependent on the satisfaction of parties and their confidence in the 
mechanism.123  
When a party requests interim relief, the tribunal must determine 
whether they have the authority to grant the request based on the 
applicable standards and procedures.124 National arbitration laws, 
specifically those modeled on the 1985 version of Article 17, lack 
clarity regarding the scope of the arbitrators’ authority.125 
Consequentially, arbitrators must reconcile governing national 
laws,126 institutional arbitration rules if incorporated into the 
 
 120. See Wang, supra note 2, at 1075. 
 121. See LEW AT AL., supra note 2, at 593 (indicating that when neither the 
governing law nor the applicable rules provide for or exclude the power of 
arbitrators to order interim relief, such power has been inferred by a number of 
tribunals); Yesilirmak, supra note 18, at 32 (noting that certain arbitral tribunals 
have inferred their power to order interim rule from existing rules). 
 122. See Naimark & Keer, supra note 3, at 11; Jernej Sekolec, The Need for 
Modern and Harmonized Regime for International Arbitration, 1 CROATIAN ARB. 
Y.B. 27, 28 (1994) (recognizing the necessity of standardized rules for clarity and 
legal certainty in arbitration). 
 123. See Guiseppe De Palo & Linda Costabile, Promotion of International 
Commercial Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in Ten 
Southern Mediterranean Countries, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 303, 304 
(2006) (asserting that countries benefit from the confidence of investors in 
arbitration). 
 124. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2001, supra note 7, at 921 
(establishing that a determination of arbitrators’ authority to order provisional 
relief is a threshold question for the party requesting relief); YESILIRMAK, supra 
note 17, at 59, 160 (recognizing that national procedural rules can constrain the 
authority of arbiters). 
 125. See 1985 Model Law, supra note 54, art. 17 (allowing for any measures 
which the arbitrators consider necessary); Lowry, supra note 28, at 340 
(recognizing the lack of a clear dividing line between arbitrators and the courts). 
 126. See Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶ 92 (recognizing that 
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arbitration agreement,127 and the will of the parties to determine the 
extent of their authority.128 While some argue that such provisions 
should remain somewhat vague to give broad discretion to 
arbitrators,129 others argue that arbitration legislation must balance 
flexibility with sufficient guidance to ease arbitrators’ confusion and 
hesitation.130 Arbitrators have attempted to glean coherent guidance 
from the disarray of arbitration laws and rules,131 but there is no 
clearly established framework on which arbitrators can rely.132  
Moreover, some states are perceived as unfriendly seats for 
arbitration133 because of the disparity within their arbitration law on 
interim measures and enforcement problems.134 The significance of 
 
arbitrators must account for the laws of the seat of the arbitration in determining 
their power to order interim relief). 
 127. See LEW ET AL., supra note 2, at 167 (referring to the parties’ choice of ad 
hoc or institutional arbitration and the subsequent governing procedural rules when 
drafting an arbitration agreement). 
 128. See Interim Award in Case 7962 of 1995, 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 
62, 62 (Spring 2000) (upholding an agreement to arbitrate, which granted the 
power to issue interim measures by the arbitral tribunal); Case 8113, supra note 
26, at 65 (illustrating how the arbitration agreement can limit powers of the 
tribunal). 
 129. See, e.g., KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 
338 (1993) (arguing that strict guidelines may curb arbitrators’ ability to tailor their 
orders for relief on a case-by-case basis). 
 130. See Sekolec, supra note 122, at 35 (pointing to the need of harmonized 
guidance for arbitrators if the needs of international arbitration are to be met). 
 131. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 160-64 (outlining the different sources 
an arbitrator must consider when determining the scope of their power); Rolf A. 
Shütze, The Precedential Effect of Arbitration Decisions, 11 J. INT’L ARB. 69, 69, 
72 (1994) (noting that while there is no true precedent in arbitration, in practice, 
published case extracts provide guidance to arbitrators). 
 132. See Lew, supra note 18, at 26 (observing that unlike national court 
procedures that clearly establish conditions under which interim measures can be 
issued, the comparatively small number of arbitration cases do not provide a 
comparable standard). 
 133. See, e.g., Phillip Capper, Section 69 and the “Interventionism” of English 
Courts, KLUWER ARB. BLOG, Sept. 23, 2009, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 
blog/2009/09/23/section-69-and-the-“interventionism”-of-english-courts/ 
(discussing the “lingering perception” of English courts as interventionist and 
therefore unfriendly to arbitration proceedings). 
 134. The traditional approach was that only “final” awards were enforceable as 
an arbitral award and that interim orders given their temporary nature did not 
qualify as “final.” See Publicis Commc’n v. True North Commc’ns, Inc., 206 F.3d 
725, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that an arbitral order must be in the form of a 
final award for judicial enforcement); Hart Surgical, Inc, v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 
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this is two-fold: first, the state may garner a negative reputation 
within the international arbitration community and second, this can 
lead to unnecessary forum shopping, as the parties determine the seat 
of the arbitration.135  
UNCITRAL believes that uniform provisions detailing the 
procedures for the enforcement of interim relief would be a 
significant step to addressing these concerns.136 By adopting the 
amendments to Article 17, states will establish the uniform 
framework that arbitration proceedings lack.137 States will harmonize 
their national laws, and in doing so, will foster stability and 
predictability in arbitration proceedings.138 This will ease 
enforcement of interim orders because states will have uniform 
standards for the scope of power of arbitral tribunals. This will 
eliminate the confusion from differing arbitration laws and will 
ensure that all states are equally appealing as potential arbitral 
seats.139  
Furthermore, adoption of the amendments to Article 17 will lead 
to greater confidence in international commercial arbitration. When 
parties are aware that a procedure exists that protects their rights in a 
 
F.3d 231, 233 (1st Cir. 2001); Mobil Oil Indon., Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indon.) Ltd., 
372 N.E.2d 21, 23 (N.Y. 1977) (commenting that a final award requires the 
complete determination of submitted claims by the arbitrators); Michaels v. 
Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a preliminary 
order unenforceable because it was not a final resolution of the issues). 
 135. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 9 (commenting that because of 
the disparity in national laws, “[a] party may well for those reasons hesitate or 
refuse to agree to a place which otherwise, for practical reasons, would be 
appropriate in the case at hand”). 
 136.  See id. pt. 2, ¶ 2 (emphasizing that the model law would harmonize 
national laws and that it reflects a “worldwide consensus”). 
 137. See Possible Uniform Rules, supra note 21, ¶¶ 86, 93 (raising the variety of 
approaches employed by states regarding interim relief and how an inclusion of 
relevant provisions in the Model Law would lead to harmonization and greater 
overall efficiency). 
 138. See Gu Weixia, Comment, Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in 
International Commercial Arbitration?, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 636 (2004) 
(noting that fostering stability and predictability are “paramount requirements” 
considered by parties in choosing arbitration). 
 139. See Benjamin G. Davis, The Color Line in International Commercial 
Arbitration: An American Perspective, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 461, 478 (2003) 
(asserting that jurisdictions unfriendly to arbitration hamper and constrain party 
autonomy). 
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manner that respects their choice of forum, they will feel more 
comfortable with their decision and have greater confidence when 
entering into arbitration agreements.140 This confidence stems from 
parties’ notions that arbitration procedures will meet their 
expectations and minimize unexpected hurdles and setbacks.141 By 
recognizing the need for harmonization and codifying the provisions 
set forth in Article 17, states can inspire this requisite confidence and 
ensure the continuing reliability and stability of the field of 
international commercial arbitration.142 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. STATES SHOULD INCORPORATE AMENDED ARTICLE 17 
INTO NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAWS 
As the processes and standards for the conduction of arbitration 
have evolved and developed over time, so too have national 
arbitration laws. States’ responses to the development of arbitration 
laws should account for advancements in model legislation regarding 
interim relief.143 To date, Mauritius, Slovenia, New Zealand, and 
Peru incorporated the Model Law amendments into their national 
law.144 By following suit and codifying the amendments to Article 
17, other states will facilitate the resolution of international 
 
 140. Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Party Autonomy and Interim Measures in 
International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 179, 180 (Albert Jan van 
den Berg ed., 2003) (arguing that party choices should be taken into consideration 
when allocating the power to order interim relief due to the contractual nature of 
arbitration). 
 141. See AXEL BÖSCH, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION - A PRACTITIONER HANDBOOK 5 (1994) (opining that 
“the unrestricted availability of provisional relief from public courts despite the 
existence of an arbitration agreement could threaten to destroy completely the 
advantages of arbitration”). 
 142. See Stephen W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation 
Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 73, 105 (2007) (heralding stability and predictability as hallmarks of fair 
legal systems). 
 143. See JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 905 (2d ed. 2007) (insisting that harmonization 
between the courts and arbitrators alone is insufficient for effective arbitration and 
advocating for a  harmonization among states in arbitration matters). 
 144. See Status of Model Law, supra note 11, ¶ 5. 
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commercial disputes by harmonizing arbitration legislation, 
increasing enforceability of interim measures,145 increasing 
confidence in international commercial arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism, and making all states equally attractive as 
seats for arbitral disputes.146 
Unfortunately, despite widespread support for the amendment 
within UNCITRAL, the majority of states have yet to seriously 
consider the incorporation of the amendment into national law.147 It 
may be that it is simply too soon to expect widespread acceptance. 
Additionally, states may have public policy reasons for not codifying 
the amendments to Article 17. For example, states may not want to 
empower arbitrators to provide interim relief or may generally place 
stricter limitations on arbitrators’ powers.148 States may also disagree 
with certain provisions of the Model Law amendment, such as the 
debated inclusion of a provision on ex parte measures.149 However, 
UNCITRAL anticipated these concerns by choosing to advance these 
improvements in the form of model legislation.150 While UNCITRAL 
hopes that states’ deviations from the Model Law text will be 
minimal, it recognizes that states may wish to make changes for 
various reasons.151  
 
 145. See Kieran Robert Hickie, The Enforceability of Interim Measures of 
Protection Granted by Arbitral Tribunals Outside the Seat of Arbitration: A New 
Approach, 12 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 221, 247-48 (2008) 
(arguing that a standard uniform framework is an important step in increasing the 
enforceability of foreign measures of interim relief). 
 146. See generally Interim Measures, supra note 22, ¶ 11 (noting that a 
country’s failure to adopt the Model Law may prohibit perspective users of 
arbitration from accessing effective court assistance in that country). 
 147. See Report of the Thirty-Second Session, supra note 28, ¶ 81. 
 148. See, e.g., Mathew Coleman, Arbitration in Africa, AFR. LEGAL INT’L 
LEGAL SERV. (2006), http://www.africalegal.co.za/ news/news_06112006.html 
(noting that South Africa’s hesitation to adopt the Model Law is rooted in its 
concerns over the scope of the court’s power in relation to the arbitration 
proceedings). 
 149. See UNCITRAL, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work 
of its Thirty-Seventh Session, ¶¶ 16-18, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/523 (Nov. 11, 2002) (noting the divergent views concerning the 
inclusion of ex parte provisions). 
 150. See 2006 Model Law, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 3 (finding model legislation to 
be the best vehicle for harmonization and modernization of national arbitration 
laws because of the flexibility it provides states when incorporating it into national 
arbitration laws). 
 151. See id. (acknowledging the flexibility of model legislation, but encouraging 
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States that do not wish to incorporate the amendments fully should 
consider incorporating at least those provisions that are 
uncontroversial as a first step in achieving greater harmonization.152 
Additionally, if states are uncomfortable with adopting certain 
provisions of the Model Law, they should discuss alternative 
methods for achieving the goals of creating uniformity to protect 
parties’ rights and facilitate arbitration proceedings.153 Last, if states 
continue to refrain from adopting the new Article 17 provisions, they 
should express the reasons for their hesitation and maintain an open 
dialogue about the future. By providing justifications for their 
reluctance, states can identify lingering concerns.154  
B. UNCITRAL SHOULD CONSIDER ADDING A PROVISION TO 
THE MODEL LAW REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OF INTERIM 
RELIEF PRIOR TO THE FORMATION OF AN ARBITRAL 
TRIBUNAL  
One of the major criticisms of delegating the power to order 
interim relief primarily to the arbitral tribunal is the difficulty of 
acquiring interim measures before the tribunal’s formation.155 To 
encourage adoption of the Model Law provisions on interim 
measures, and to make them more comprehensive, UNCITRAL 
should consider adding a provision on obtaining interim relief before 
the arbitral tribunal is formed.156 This provision should provide for 
 
states incorporating the Model Law to make as few changes as possible). 
 152. See, e.g., International Arbitration Act 2008, Act. No. 37, pt. IV (Dec. 13, 
2008) (Mauritius) available at http://supremeco urt.intnet.mu/Entry/dyn/GuestGet 
Doc.Asp?Doc_Idx=7110944&Mode=Html&Search=No (codifying the majority of 
the 2006 version of Model Law Article 17, but choosing to refrain from including 
provisions on ex parte preliminary orders). 
153 See, e.g., Launch of a New International Arbitration Forum Via E-Mail, 12 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 279, 279 (2001) (announcing the creation of a discussion forum 
for the purposes of exchanging information and hosting debates on arbitration 
issues). 
 154. Cf. Tómas Kennedy-Grant, Promised Land or Fire Swamp? Interim 
Measures – The New Zealand Revolution: A Commentary 24 (Nov. 30, 2007) 
available at http://www.kennedygrant.com/docs/Fire%20Swamp .pdf (responding 
to concerns regarding the risks of “trailblazing” in the field). 
 155. See Arbitration and the Courts, supra note 77, at 82-86 (enunciating the 
difficulties encountered in securing interim relief by parties to an arbitration prior 
to the formation of the arbitral tribunal). 
 156. See, e.g., International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Dispute 
Resolution Procedures, art. 37 (June 1, 2010) (permitting the use of emergency 
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the rapid appointment of a temporary authority to resolve only those 
matters related to immediate interim relief.157 
One could argue that such measures are unnecessary because of 
the courts’ concurrent jurisdiction.158 However, having a provision 
that allow parties to obtain interim relief without recourse to the 
courts demonstrates respect for the parties’ choice of arbitration and 
meets their expectation that arbitration will effectively resolve their 
dispute.159 Including a provision on attaining relief prior to the 
formation of the tribunal and without recourse to the courts would 
help alleviate parties’ uncertainty about whether such relief is 
available prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal, and would 
assist in harmonizing existing arbitration rules leading to a more 
effective overall system. 
C. THE UNCITRAL MODEL ARBITRATION RULES SHOULD BE 
AMENDED TO CREATE UNIFORMITY WITH THE MODEL LAW 
In light of the amendments made to the Model Law, UNCITRAL 
undertook work to amend the Model Rules on Arbitration,160 which 
are primarily used for ad hoc arbitration proceedings.161 The Working 
 
measures of protection by a specially appointed emergency arbitrator); ICC Rules, 
supra note 23, art. 20(4) (allowing for the appointment of an independent 
individual for the limited purpose of inspected disputed property to make a 
statement regarding their condition); see also Schwartz, supra note 85, at 58 
(tracking the incorporation of provisions on emergency relief prior to the 
appointment of the arbitral tribunal into institutional rules). 
 157. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2009, supra note 18, at 
1971 (explaining that under certain emergency procedures, a sole arbitrator can be 
appointed to hear requests for provisional relief). 
 158. See supra Part II.B (explaining that requests to courts for interim relief are 
not incompatible with the arbitration agreement). 
 159. See YESILIRMAK, supra note 17, at 2 (reiterating the challenge of meeting 
the expectations of a business person with regard to the interim protection of rights 
in arbitration). 
 160. UNCITRAL, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 1, delivered to the 
general assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.145/Add.1 (Dec. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules Revision I] (designating the revision of the 
UNCITRAL Rules as a priority for the Working Group and instructing the 
Working Group to identify areas of improvement). 
 161. See Judith Levine, UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration Proposes 
Revisions to Arbitration Rules, 19(4) WHITE & CASE INT’L DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (Dec. 
2006) (identifying the UNCITRAL Model Rules as the most widely used 
procedural rules in ad hoc arbitrations). It should also be noted that many regional 
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Group on Arbitration and Conciliation is currently drafting revisions 
to the Model Rules, among them provisions on interim measures of 
protection in Article 26.162 The draft text proposed by the Working 
Group is modeled closely on Article 17 of the Model Law,163 based 
on the general consensus that the revision will further clarify the 
conditions, circumstances, and procedures for granting interim 
relief.164 The only area of contention is whether to include the 
provision on ex parte measures into the Article 26 of the Model 
Rules.165 To foster consistency and further harmonization, 
UNCITRAL should adopt the proposed revisions of the Working 
Group on Article 26 of the Model Rules.  
CONCLUSION 
As the field of international commercial arbitration develops to 
meet the needs of globalizing trade and commerce, the availability of 
interim measures in the arbitral context has become a primary 
concern. UNCITRAL attempted to remedy these concerns by 
providing model legislation on interim measures for states to 
incorporate into their national laws. For the reasons set forth above, 
there should be widespread adoption of the amended Article 17. The 
Model Law’s purpose is to promote a uniformity of procedure among 
states with diverse legislation, which will ultimately increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the international commercial 
arbitration system as a whole. The advantages that draw parties to 
 
arbitration centers have also adopted the UNCITRAL Model Rules. See id. 
 162. See UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration), Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ¶ 26, 
delivered to the General Assembly, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.149 (Nov. 30, 2007) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules Revision II] (redlining Article 26, removing the old 
article completely and substituting a much more in depth approach to interim 
measures). 
 163. See id. (providing the draft text of the proposed revisions to Article 26 with 
minor deviations in language and substance, but not including a provision on ex 
parte measures). 
 164. See UNCITRAL Rules Revision I, supra note 160, ¶ 25 (attempting to create 
consistency with the amended provisions to Article 17 in the model law and ensure 
that party autonomy is given proper effect). 
 165. See UNCITRAL Rules Revision II, supra note 162, ¶¶ 28-29 (avoiding 
language on “preliminary orders,” but agreeing to consider adding a provision to 
allow the tribunal to take appropriate measure to avoid frustration of the final 
award). 
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arbitration amount to nothing unless the tribunal is able to protect the 
parties’ rights during the arbitral process. States and arbitral 
institutions should incorporate the improvements made by 
UNCITRAL into their laws and rules to secure the rights of parties 
both to choose their means for dispute resolution and to receive fair 
and effective process.   
 
